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RESTORING PRE-EXISTING COMPLIANCE THROUGH
THE FCPA PILOT PROGRAM
Andrew Spalding*
ABSTRACT
F OR a quarter-century, incentives to invest in corporate compliance
programs have been a cornerstone of federal white-collar enforcement.
But the U.S. Department of Justice's most recent announcement of anti-bribery
enforcement policy-the FCPA Pilot Program-takes a peculiar and possibly
inadvertent turn. In providing newly transparent and explicit penalty reductions,
and rolling out the Department's declination policy, the program neglects to
incentivize investments in pre-existing compliance. Though remedial, or post-
violation, compliance receives a newly heightened importance, pre-existing
compliance receives virtually no attention. This is strange, but should not be
understood as a new policy change on the benefits of pre-existing compliance; no
conceptual basis for devaluing preventative compliance programs exists. Rather,
it is likely an oversight, innocent in origin but far from innocuous in application.
Now is the time to address it.
This article argues that pre-existing compliance should be restored to its
rightful place at the center of FCPA enforcement policy. It describes the rise of
federal incentivizes to invest in pre-existing compliance, beginning with the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and continuing through Delaware corporate law,
Sarbanes-Oxley, a series of Deputy Attorney General memoranda, the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, the FCPA Guidance, and recent FCPA enforcement actions.
It then describes the FCPA Pilot Program and how pre-existing compliance
somehow, inexplicably, drifted out of its traditionally central role in enforcement
policy. The article concludes with suggesting a number of ways to think about
how the Pilot Program's current policies can be preserved and honored, while
restoring pre-existing compliance to the place that most all stakeholders to FCPA
enforcement-companies, compliance professionals, FCPA lawyers, and even
the enforcement authorities themselves-believe it should hold.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law, and Senior Editor of The FCPA
Blog. Many thanks to the Toledo Law Review for sponsoring an excellent symposium and for their
editing miracles on this article.
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INTRODUCTION
For a quarter century, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") has offered
incentives to corporations to invest in compliance programs.' These programs
help deter violations of federal law while imposing minimal burdens on the
public fisc; in this regard they are a highly cost-effective tool in the federal
enforcement arsenal.2 Charging and sentencing policy have thus been tethered to
the dual moors of pre-existing compliance (compliance improvements made prior
to a known violation, with the intent to prevent violations in the first place) and
remedial compliance (compliance enhancements made after the government
investigates a violation and as a term of the eventual settlement to prevent repeat
violations). Incentives to invest in both pre-existing and remedial compliance are
strewn throughout the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ memoranda, the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, informal DOJ guidance, and settlement documents.
3
But in international anti-bribery law specifically, the recent DOJ policy has
4begun to drift from arguably the bigger and more reliable of these moors.
Seemingly inadvertently, as if by omission and not design, pre-existing
compliance has suddenly dropped out of the conversation. The DOJ's
experimental "Pilot Program,",5 announced in April 2016 and continuing into
2017, provides a series of specified rewards for voluntary disclosure,
cooperation, and remediation. 6 In so doing, the Pilot Program advances the
historical practice of rewarding remedial compliance. But quite strangely, the
program makes virtually no mention of pre-existing compliance. So too does
each of the five settlements thus far formally announced under the Pilot Program
award a declination without any mention of the defendant's pre-existing
compliance. 8 Although evaluating the defendants' pre-existing compliance may
have been part of the private negotiations, they are playing no part in the public
announcements. 9 This is ironic, given the historical centrality of pre-existing
compliance to enforcement policy, not to mention the Pilot Program's stated goal
1. Compliance may be defined as "the processes by which an organization seeks to ensure
that employees and other constituents conform to applicable norms-which can include either the
requirements of laws or regulations or the internal rules of the organization." GEOFFREY P. MILLER,
THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
2. Id.
3. See Andrew Brady Spalding, On Maximizing Deterrence Per Dollar, 67 FLA. L. REV. F.
233, 236 (2016).
4. See generally ANDREW WEISSMANN, CRIM. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD
SECTION'S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download [hereinafter "FCPA Pilot
Enforcement Plan"].
5. Id. at 2-4, 7-9.
6. Id. at 3, 8-9.
7. See infra Part 11.
8. See infra Part 11.
9. See FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 4-8.
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of "encourag[ing] companies to implement strong anti-corruption compliance
programs."1
This article argues that the DOJ simply must restore pre-existing
compliance to the prominent place it has always held in enforcement policy. To
the extent we still believe that incentivizing investments in pre-existing
compliance is good policy-and there is absolutely no indication that we do
not-pre-existing compliance should return to the center of enforcement policy.
Accordingly, this article explores why and how we might bring pre-existing
compliance back. It begins with an analysis of why pre-existing compliance is
critical to federal enforcement policy, showing its centrality to federal policy
statements over the last 25 years. It then describes the seemingly inadvertent
omission of pre-existing compliance from the Pilot Program announcement. It
ends by proposing several ways of bringing pre-existing compliance back to the
forefront of enforcement policy, in the hopes of contributing to the policy debate
that should now occur.
I. THE RISE OF PRE-EXISTING COMPLIANCE l
To appreciate the peculiar abeyance of pre-existing compliance in
contemporary sentencing policy, one needs to understand why pre-existing
compliance is important and how it has figured in sentencing policy up to this
point. This section does each, in turn.
A. Why Incentivize Pre-Existing Compliance?
The principal goal of federal white-collar enforcement is general
deterrence: reducing violations by putting prospective violators on notice that
should they be caught, they too will be punished. 2 General deterrence has thus
been called the "holy grail" of criminal enforcement. 3 Because an enforcement
agency begins with a limited budget, its goal is to get maximal deterrence within
those limits. Put another way, it wants the greatest deterrence "bang for the
buck."' 14 This "bang" might be best expressed as a ratio: deterrence per dollar
("DPD").15 An enforcement agency seeks to maximize this ratio, getting as
much deterrence as possible for the dollars it has available.' 6
Efforts to increase deterrence can then be understood as tinkering with
either half of this ratio. The government may seek to increase the numerator,
10. Id. at 2.
11. Portions of this section were previously published by the author. See Spalding, supra note
3.
12. Id. at 235.
13. Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 91
IOWA L. REV. 505, 515 (2006).
14. See Spalding, supra note 3, at 234.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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while keeping the denominator constant. ' 7 That is, it might find ways to improve
general deterrence without increasing its budget, rendering enforcement more
efficient.18 Or, it may on occasion find its denominator increased, in which case
it has an increased budget. 19  With an increased denominator comes an
expectation that the additional enforcement efforts this money will buy will at the
very least keep the ratio constant. 20 Each of these-increasing deterrence on a
fixed budget, or increasing the budget-will happen from time to time in an
enforcement agency's history. But irrespective of the denominator (the budget's
size), the government seeks to maximize DPD.
2 1
In Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") enforcement, the DOJ is now
doing both. On the denominator side, the DOJ is increasing enforcement
resources. 22 In April of 2016, the DOJ announced that ten new prosecutors were
added to the Fraud Section's FCPA Unit, an increase of more than 50%.23 So too
did the FBI create "three new teams of special agents dedicated to FCPA
investigations and prosecutions." 24 The DOJ has increased its resources in an
additional way. In November 2015, the DOJ Fraud Section hired a full-time
compliance expert, Hui Chen. 25 The DOJ's expressed purpose in retaining Chen
is to provide "expert guidance" to prosecutors as they evaluate the compliance
programs that were in place at the time the misconduct occurred.26 Chen will
help the DOJ develop benchmarks for compliance programs and, to this end,
communicate with stakeholders. 27  Similarly, when the resolution of a case
includes requiring enhanced compliance measures, Chen will be involved in
evaluating those measures. 28 This is one critically important part to increasing
the effectiveness of anti-bribery enforcement.
Another is to increase the numerator-to develop increasingly efficient
ways of spending public resources. The DOJ is also making important strides in
this area. The first step towards increased efficiency occurred in September 2015
when the Deputy Attorney General released a memo, now known as the "Yates
Memo," announcing a new focus on individual liability for corporate
wrongdoing.29 With a declared intention to "fully leverage its resources," or in
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 1-2.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id.
25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the
Dep't of Justice Fraud Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/
790236/download.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney General, on Individual Accountability
for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/
download [hereinafter "Yates Memo"].
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other words, maximize DPD, the DOJ announced six changes to policy, each of
which was incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.30 First, a company will
not receive cooperation credit unless it provides to the DOJ "all relevant facts
relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct." 3' "[T]he company
must identify all individuals ... regardless of their position" in the company and
provide all relevant information 32 Second, both "criminal and civil corporate
investigations should focus on individuals from the ... [start] of the
investigation." 33  Third, the attorneys handling the civil and criminal
investigations should communicate with each other regularly. 34 In the FCPA
context, this would typically mean the DOJ and SEC attorneys. Fourth,
corporate resolutions-meaning deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements-will not provide protection from liability for individuals within the
company.35 Fifth, the corporate resolutions should not occur "without a clear
plan to resolve ... individual cases before the statute of limitations expires."
36
Finally, civil lawyers should decide whether to prosecute individuals based on
factors other than an ability to pay a penalty.37
Similarly, the DOJ has announced a new focus on international
cooperation. 38 The Department "has increasingly been working collaboratively
to combat bribery schemes that cross national borders" by sharing leads,
documents, and witnesses with foreign enforcement authorities.
3
A third way the Department has sought to increase its deterrence "bang for
the buck," is the FCPA Pilot Program, discussed below.
40
But there is an additional, and perhaps less appreciated, instrument in the
government's arsenal for increasing deterrence: incentivizing the adoption of
compliance programs. 41 Compliance might be understood as a kind of
preemptive deterrence. 2 That is, rather than waiting until a defendant violates
the law, and using that case to fire a shot across industry's bow, federal law can
induce companies to invest in programs that will help to reduce violations in the
first place.4  In this sense, it achieves general deterrence without reliance on
specific deterrence. It is truly preventative.
Compliance as a matter of practice has erupted in the last two decades or so,
leading Professor Sean Griffith to announce that "American corporations have
30. Id. at 2-6.
31. Id. at 3-4.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 3-4.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3, 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3, 5-6.
38. FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 2.
39. Id.
40. See infra Part II.
41. See Spalding, supra note 3, at 235.
42. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM 62, 70-71 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011).
43. See Spalding, supra note 3, at 235.
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witnessed the dawn of a new era: the era of compliance." 4 Griffith explains that
"[c]ompliance does not fit traditional ... [forms] of corporate governance [in
that] [i]t does not come from the board of directors, state corporate law, or
federal securities law, [but is] instead ... an internal governance structure
imposed upon the firm from the outside by enforcement agents. 45 It thus upends
the idea that "governance arrangements ... [should] be the product of a bargain
between shareholders and managers," substituting instead the will of a
government enforcer, and reinvigorating older debates about the fundamental
purposes of the firh.4 6 The Government thus gets inside the firm, getting the
company to do the government's work without taxing the public. The company
detects its own violations, conducts its own investigation, and (hopefully)
addresses the problem of its own accord.47  To the extent that reporting and
cooperation are part of compliance, this is an even more dramatic example.4 8 But
there can be little question that outsourcing enforcement to the firm through
compliance programs is highly cost-effective to the public (though it may not be
to the company).
Appreciating these benefits, U.S. white-collar enforcement has historically
made pre-existing compliance a cornerstone of enforcement policy, as the next
subsection describes.
B. The Historical Centrality of Pre-Existing Compliance in Enforcement
Policy
As described above, compliance exists (for sentencing policy purposes) in
two forms: preventative and remedial.50 Federal law and policy have rewarded
either or both, and have again done so at two phases of enforcement: the charging
phase, where the enforcement agency determines whether and how to charge the
company, and, if liability is to attach to the defendant's conduct, the penalty
phase.
As this subsection will show, both forms of compliance are manifest
throughout the constellation of formal and informal statements of law and policy
that shape enforcement today. This subsection pieces together the history of
federal incentives to invest in pre-existing compliance by examining the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, Delaware corporate law, federal statutes governing
business conduct, memoranda written by Deputy Attorneys General, the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, the DOJ's and SEC's FCPA Guidance, and the settlement
documents of contemporary FCPA enforcement actions. Examining these
sources shows not only that both pre-existing and remedial compliance have been
44. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2077 (2016).
45. Id. at 2075.
46. Id. at 2079.
47. Id. at 2082.
48. See Spalding, supra note 3, at 233-35, 238, 240.
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id. at 233, 234-36.
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thought essential to sentencing, but that the former-pre-existing compliance-
has historically occupied the larger place.
1. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
We might begin the story of incentivizing compliance in the 1980s, when
the Sentencing Guidelines did not yet exist.51 As the U.S. Supreme Court has
observed, "the broad discretion of sentencing courts" had produced "significant
sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders." 52  Congress thus
created the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1984, and then in 1987 passed the
Sentencing Reform Act,53 which directed the Commission to promulgate federal
sentencing guidelines. 54 Though the U.S. Supreme Court would hold in 2005
that the Guidelines are merely advisory, 55 they nonetheless figure prominently in
the calculation of FCPA sentences today.
56
The Sentencing Guidelines today provide that a corporate fine depends "on
the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization.,
57
"Culpability generally will be determined by six factors."58 The four that will
increase the organization's punishment "are: (i) the involvement in or tolerance
of criminal activity; (ii) the prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of
an order; and (iv) the obstruction of justice. 59
But two factors will mitigate punishment, and here lies the first appearance
of pre-existing compliance.60 Those factors are "self-reporting, cooperation, or
acceptance of resRonsibility;" and "the existence of an effective compliance and
ethics program."' The mitigating factors thus have two dimensions: how the
51. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1 (2015), http://www.
ussc.gov/sites/default/flles/pdf/research-and-pubications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellane
ous/201510_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf.
52. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (2013).
53. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
54. See FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 51, at 1.
55. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227, 245-46 (2005).
56. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016),
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual (select "Download the complete Manual"
hyperlink for PDF version).
57. Id. ch. 8 introductory cmt.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Draft Guidelines "focused on four components: policies and procedures,
communication, monitoring, and enforcement." Griffith, supra note 44, at 2085 (citing NOLAN E.
CLARK, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.23 (Pre-
Publication Staff Working Group Draft 2016)). The Sentencing Guidelines were amended twice in
ways relevant to compliance. In 2004, revisions "require[d] a 'culture' of ethics and a risk
assessment (or 'best practice gaps' analysis)" as part of an adequate compliance program, and
require "internal controls to promote compliance" as well as setting up incentives and disciplinary
measures. CAROLE BASRI, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 27 (2017). In 2010, the Guidelines were again
amended to establish four criteria for "receiv[ing] a deduction in the culpability score," the first of
which is that compliance officers are obligated to report directly "to the governing authority." Id.
The remaining three criteria are: "(2) the compliance program detected the offense before outside
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organization responded in the wake of the violation, and what good-faith
preventative measures were in place at the time of the violation-namely,
compliance. Note that remedial compliance is not explicitly mentioned, though it
might be implicit in the acceptance of responsibility.
It is noteworthy that compliance first appears as pre-existing compliance;
remedial compliance is present only by implication. The Guidelines explain that
they:
offer incentives to organizations to reduce and ultimately eliminate criminal
conduct by providing a structural foundation from which an organization may self-
police its own conduct through an effective compliance and ethics program. The
prevention and detection of criminal conduct, as facilitated by an effective
compliance and ethics program, will assist an organization in encouraging ethical
conduct and in complying fully with all applicable laws.
62
But for the obvious reason that general deterrence includes preventing
recidivism, the Guidelines address remedial compliance in Part B, "Remedying
Harm from Criminal Conduct, and Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.
'O
Still, it does so by sounding both preventative and remedial themes. The
Guidelines explain that "[t]he failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does
not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective in preventing and
detecting criminal conduct."6 In assessing compliance programs, the Guidelines
provide seven criteria.65  The seventh is "After criminal conduct has been
detected, the organization shall take reasonable steps to respond appropriately to
the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar criminal conduct, including
making any necessary modifications to the organization's compliance and ethics
program.
Finally, in Part C, the Guidelines calculate the fines. In determining the
range, a penalty reduction of three points is available when the organization "had
discovery"; (3) the corporation promptly self-reported; and "(4) no compliance officer participated
in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense." Id.
62. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 56, ch. 8 introductory cmt.
63. Id. § 8B1.
64. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
65. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(l)-(7). The exercise of due diligence in the prevention and detection of
criminal conduct, and an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct; the exclusion from
"substantial authority" of personnel known to have engaged in illegal or unethical conduct; the
regular communication of standards and procedures, and regular training; regular monitoring and
auditing of the compliance program, and a protected whistleblower mechanism; the use of
incentives and disciplinary measures to promote the effective implementation of the program; and
the rapid and effective response to detected misconduct, including making any necessary changes
to the compliance program. Id.
66. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(7). Commentary further provides, "[T]he organization should act
appropriately to prevent further similar criminal conduct, including assessing the compliance and
ethics program and making modifications necessary to ensure the program is effective." Id.
§ 8B2.1 cmt. n.6.
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in place at the time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics program."
67
In determining the fine within the sentencing range, judges should consider
eleven factors, including "whether the organization failed to have, at the time of
the instant offense, an effective compliance and ethics program.,
68
Just as one would expect, the Sentencing Guidelines give treatment to both
preventative and remedial compliance. But if it can be fairly said that one
receives more attention than the other, pre-existing compliance would come out
on top. And this should not surprise us, for reasons to be explored below.
2. Delaware Corporate Law
Five years after promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the second
important installment would come in the form of Delaware corporate law.
6 9
In In re Caremark International Derivative Litigation,70 shareholders
brought a derivative suit alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duty of
care by failing to exercise sufficient oversight related to employee violations of
certain health care regulations. The Board submitted a settlement proposal in
which it agreed to more rigorous monitoring to prevent similar violations.7'
While finding a "very low probability" that a breach of the duty of care had
occurred, the court cited the Sentencing Guidelines adopted eight years earlier
and noted the increasing use of federal criminal law to assure corporate
compliance with environmental, financial, employee and product safety, and
other health and safety regulations.72 The court observed that the relatively new
Guidelines imposed substantially heavier penalties on corporations, while at the
same time providing substantial incentives, in the form of reduced penalties, to
invest in compliance programs.73 The court found that "[a]ny rational person
67. Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6. "If the offense occurred even though the organization had in place at
the time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics program, as provided in § 8B2.1
(Effective Compliance and Ethics Program), subtract 3 points." Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Similarly, there
is a rebuttable presumption that the organization's compliance and ethics program was not effective
if an individual who is either "high-level personnel" within a small organization, or has "substantial
authority" within any organization, "participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of, the
offense." Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). But that provision should not apply where "the individual or
individuals with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program have direct
reporting obligations to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup," "the compliance and
ethics program detected the offense before discovery outside the organization or before such
discovery was reasonably likely," or "no individual with operational responsibility for the
compliance and ethics program participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense."
Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C)(i)-(iv) (internal citations omitted). So too may upward departures be
warranted where the compliance ethics program was installed in response to a court order or
administrative order or was required by law to have an effective program but did not. Id. § 8C4.10.
So too may companies be put on probation if they were required under law to have an effective
program in place but did not. Id. § 8D 1.1 (a)(3).
68. Id. § 8C2.8(a)(1 1).
69. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 972.
72. Id. at 961.
73. Id. at 969.
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attempting in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility
would be bound to take into account [the Sentencing Guidelines] and the
enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers. 7 4
Accordingly, the court explained that corporate boards cannot satisfy their
obligation to stay reasonably informed concerning the corporation without
making sure that "information and reporting systems exist in the organization
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board
itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board
... to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance
with law and its business performance. 75 Accordingly, the court held:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate,
exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least,
render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal
standards.
76
Though finding no breach had occurred, the case nonetheless provides the
foundation for the compliance standards that will shortly work their way into the
memoranda of Deputy Attorneys General and ultimately the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual. 77 These standards plainly concern pre-existing, rather than remedial,
compliance.
3. Deputy U.S. Attorney General Memoranda and the U.S. Attorneys 'Manual
The U.S. Department of Justice would rely on both the Guidelines and
Caremark in drafting a series of widely read memoranda on enforcement
policy.78 In five memos, written over ten years by successive Deputy Attorneys
General, the Department would describe the factors federal prosecutors should
consider when deciding whether to charge a company.79 The memos are perhaps
best known today for their controversial and evolving position on the issue of
waiving attorney-client privilege.g0  But the memos also address the role of
74. Id. at 970.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Delaware Chancery Court would affirm the Caremark holding, and clarified in
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (finding that a breach of the monitoring duty occurs when
the board either "utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls" or if
"having implemented such system or controls, consciously fails to monitor oversee its operations").
77. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11 /charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter "Holder Memo"]
(incorporated into the U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.000, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-
9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.300 (last visited May 7,
2017)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-28.710.
[Vol. 48
FCPA PILOT PROGRAM
compliance, both preventative and remedial, with a heavier emphasis on the
former.
i. The Holder Memorandum (1999)
Eric Holder, the then Deputy Attorney General, provided "guidance as to
what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in deciding whether to charge
a corporation in a particular case." 8' The memo lays out eight factors, the fifth of
which is the "existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program." The memo explained that the DOJ "encourages such corporate self-
policing," though the existence of a compliance program is not itself a sufficient
basis for declining to charge a corporation, and the existence of such a program
does not absolve the company from respondeat superior liability.83 Instead, the
prosecutor should evaluate the program by two criteria: (1) whether the program
is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting
wrongdoing; and (2) whether corporate management is enforcing the program
effectively and in good faith or is instead merely a "paper program."
84
Specifically, the prosecutor should consider, in relation to the pre-existing
compliance program, the comprehensiveness of the compliance program and
improvements to the program taken as remediation subsequent to discovering the
violation.8 5  Prosecutors should consider whether the compliance program is
"merely a 'paper Program' or whether it was designed and implemented in an
effective manner. To this end, prosecutors should consider whether staffing is
sufficient to "audit, document, analyze, and utilize" the compliance program and
whether employees are "adequately informed about the compliance program and
are convinced of the corporation's commitment to it." 87 This concern existed
from the start, and it is inherent in rewarding compliance.
The memo also mentions compliance in remedial context.88 Immediately
following the discussion of pre-existing compliance is "[t]he corporation's
remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate
compliance program or to improve an existing one."89 The memo explains that
the DOJ should recognize and reward corporation's "quick recognition of the
flaws in the program and its efforts to improve the program[,j" 9 but remedial
compliance gets relatively brief attention.
81. Holder Memo, supra note 77.
82. Id. at Federal Prosecution of Corporations Part lI.A.5.
83. Id. at Part VIIA.
84. Id. at Part VIL.B.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at Part V111.
89. Id. at Part II.A.6.
90. Id. at Part VIII.B.
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ii. The Thompson Memorandum (2003)
Subsequently, Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson provided the
next installment in this series in 2003.91 The Thompson Memo reiterated both
"the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program" and,
immediately afterwards, "the corporation's remedial actions, including any
efforts to implement an effective compliance program or to improve an existing
one. '92 The Thompson Memo repeats much of same language from the Holder
Memo, leaving the policy substantially unchanged. 93 But Thompson would add
significant clauses that express relying on Caremark.94 The Thompson Memo
thus explains that in evaluating compliance programs, prosecutors should
consider the directors' independent review of officers' recommendations, the
adequacy of the internal audit function, and the internal gathering and reporting
of information to the board.95 The principal focus thus remains on pre-existing
compliance.
iii. The McNulty Memorandum (2007)
Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty would make two important
changes to enforcement policy.96 In enumerating a list of factors prosecutors
should consider, the McNulty Memorandum97 added a ninth factor not seen in
Holder and Thompson: "[T]he adequacy of the prosecution of individuals
responsible for the corporation's malfeasance." 98 In so doing, the memo first
announces a policy that has reached its zenith in the 2015 Yates Memo.
99
Secondly, the McNulty Memo introduces a term that would become essential to
compliance discussions: "pre-existing."' 100 McNulty would take the fifth factor,
"the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program," (as in
Holder and Thompson) and modify it to read, "the existence and adequacy of the
corporation's pre-existing compliance program."' 0'  While this new adjective
would not appear to alter the substance in any way-it seemed clear that the fifth
91. See generally Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/abalmigrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv dojthomp.authch
eckdam.pdf.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 9-10.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/
2007/07/05/mcnulty..memo.pdf (last visited May 7, 2017) [hereinafter "McNulty Memo"].
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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factor referred to compliance programs that existed at the time of the violation-
it would provide a bit of clarification.
iv. The Morford Memo (March 2008)
Somewhat outside the stream of the Holder, Thompson, McNulty, and Filip
Memos is the March 2008 memo of Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig S.
Morford. This document had a different and specific purpose: to discuss the use
of monitors in deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. 1 2 The
memo explained that corporate monitors are used in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements because "[t]he corporation
benefits from expertise in the area of corporate compliance from an independent
third party" and the corporation, as well as "its shareholders, employees and the
public at large, "then benefit[s] from reduced recidivism of corporate crime and
the protection of the integrity of the marketplace."'10 3 While the details on criteria
for use of monitors are not important to present purposes, the memo bears
mentioning for its attention to remedial compliance.'
v. The Filip Memo (August 2008)
The August 2008 memo of Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip was most
important for its final statement on the waiver issue, reversing the Department's
earlier policy of requiring waiver for full cooperation credit.' 0 5  Perhaps
secondarily, Filip would announce the formal adoption of the principles of prior
memos into the United States Attorneys' Manual, making them binding on all
federal prosecutors within the DOJ. 10 6 The memo reiterates those nine factors,
deleting the underlining from "pre-existing" but otherwise preserving the rest of
the language concerning pre-existing compliance. So too is the sixth factor,
concerning remedial compliance, left unchanged.
10 7
vi. The U.S. Attorneys'Manual
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual thus incorporates language concerning pre-
existing compliance from the Holder, Thompson, McNulty, and Filip Memos.
0 8
The enumerated factors (now up to ten) that prosecutors must consider include
102. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., on Selection and Use
of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with
Corporations (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/
morford-useofrnonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.
103. Id. at 1-2.
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-
memo-08282008.pdf.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at4.
108. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-28.300.
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the now-familiar two provisions on pre-existing compliance and remedial
compliance.' 0 9 So too do the longer explanations of these respective forms of
compliance, found at Sections 9-28.800 (adequacy and effective of pre-existing
compliance) and 9-28.1100 (remediation), mirror the Memos' language." 
0
vii. The Seaboard Report
Though Filip would be the last chapter in this series of DOJ Memoranda,"
there is perhaps one noteworthy addendum to those memos written by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2001.' 12 In the now well-known
Seaboard Report, the commission settled a cease-and-desist proceeding against
the former controller of a public company's subsidiary, but it declined to take
action against the parent company."1 3 The Report praises the parent company's
internal investigation, voluntary disclosure, cooperation, remedial personnel
decisions, and internal control reforms." 4  It then uses the cease-and-desist
decision to announce thirteen factors that the Commission will consider in
determining whether to bring charges against a company." 5 Generall%, the
Seaboard focus is on detection, investigation, disclosure, and cooperation.' 6 But
preventative compliance gets explicit mention." 17 The second of the 13 Seaboard
factors asks, "How did the misconduct arise?" and, in elaborating on that
question further asks, "What compliance procedures were in place to prevent the
misconduct now uncovered?" and "Why did those procedures fail to stop or
inhibit the wrongful conduct?" '" 8 While the report does not use the DOJ's
language of remedial compliance, it does consider, at factor 12, "What
assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur? Did the company adopt
and ensure enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and
109. Id. § 9-28.300(5), (7).
110. Id. §§9-28.800,.1100.
111. Many such memos were written on other topics. Most notably, the 2015 Yates Memo,
while following in this line of Deputy AG-named memos announcing enforcement policy, moved
beyond the attorney-client privilege issue and expounded a new DOJ focus on prosecuting
individuals. Like the prior memos, it modified existing DOJ policy on other areas of
enforcement-in this case, particularly that investigations should focus on individual liability from
the onset, and the requirement that companies disclose all available information on individual
liability to receive full cooperation credit. Unlike those memos, it did not have occasion to mention
the relevance of pre-existing compliance programs. Brent Snyder, Remarks as Prepared for the
Yale School of Management Global Antitrust Enforcement Conference (Feb. 19, 2016), transcript
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/82672 I/download.
112. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions ("Seaboard Report"), Exchange Act Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct?" ' 19 Perhaps
using the parlance of securities laws, the SEC frames the remedial actions in
terms of internal controls rather than compliance.
But Seaboard continues the pattern seen in the DOJ memos and in the
previous Sentencing Guidelines. Both pre-existing and remedial compliance get
mentioned, 20 but the heavier emphasis is on pre-existing compliance. 121
4. Federal Business Law: Sarbanes-Oxley
Enacted in 2002 after the accounting scandals at Enron, World Com, and
elsewhere, Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") 122 codified several federal requirements for
public companies that enhanced U.S. compliance practices. Notably, all
measures refer to pre-existing compliance rather than remedial. 1
23
Section 302 requires that public company CEOs and CFOs make a series of
certifications that will tend to induce those officers to strengthen compliance.
124
In the company's quarterly and annual report, the CEO and CFO must certify that
they have reviewed the reports; that those reports are not misleading; that those
officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; that
those officers have evaluated the effectiveness of internal controls in the 90 days
preceding the report; and that those officers have disclosed to the auditors any
fraud by management or other employees with important roles in the company's
internal controls. 1
25
Similarly, § 404 requires annual financial reports to include an Internal
Control Report stating that management is responsible for the internal controls
and providing an assessment of those controls' effectiveness. 126 Less directly,
but still relevant to compliance, § 406 requires corporations to adopt codes of127
ethics for senior financial officers. Moreover, the SOX final rule commentary
encourages a code of ethics (or code of conduct) for all employees that is tailored
to the needs of the specific corporation. 128 Section 806 establishes whistleblower
protections. 129
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2)-(5) (2002).
124. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 302.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2)-(5). See also BASR1, supra note 61, at 22-23.
126. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 404.
127. Id.
128. BASRI, supra note 61, at 23-24. More recently, but less directly, Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires the SEC to pay whistleblowers who voluntarily
provide information about violations of federal securities laws that leads to a successful
enforcement action with sanctions more than $1,000,000, and prohibits the employer's retaliation
against whistleblowers. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1841 (2010).
129. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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5. The DOJ's and SEC's FCPA Guidance
A decade after SOX, the DOJ and SEC would draft their 2012 A Resource
Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("Guidance"). 130  This
document is a particularly illustrative example of the DOJ's emphasis on pre-
existing rather than remedial compliance, as the latter receives only brief mention
while the former gets extensive treatment.
The Guidance is made necessary by a somewhat peculiar feature of FCPA
enforcement: cases have historically very rarely gone to the courts, instead
settling out of court through non-prosecution and deferred prosecution
agreements. 13 1 As a result, we have very little case law, and the DOJ and SEC
have helped to fill that void with this soft law document.' 32 Though not formally
law, it describes the enforcement agencies' views on what the FCPA means,
providing informal guidance for the out-of-court enforcement process. 133
In addition to describing substantive law, the Guidance describes
enforcement procedures, including the factors the agencies will consider in
determining whether to charge a company and how to determine the sentence.
1 34
Chapter 5, "Guiding Principles of Enforcement," begins by affirming that
deciding "[w]hether and how the DOJ will commence, decline, or otherwise
resolve an FCPA matter is guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the
case of individuals, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations for companies."' 35 The Guidance summarizes Chapter 9-28.000
of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, which, as stated above, originated in the Holder
Memo, and further references both pre-existing and remedial compliance. 
36
The section then contains two subsections: "Self-Reporting, Cooperation,
and Remedial Efforts" and "Corporate Compliance Program. ' 7 The former
summarizes past sources, particularly the Sentencing Guidelines, in a
straightforward way.
But the subsection dedicated to pre-existing compliance presents a contrast
in styles. It begins by citing not just the Sentencing Guidelines, as had the prior
section, but also a bevy of other publications by practitioners, academics, the
International Chamber of Commerce, and even Transparency International.
38
"In a global marketplace," it begins, "an effective compliance program ... is
essential to detecting and preventing FCPA violations." 3 A compliance
130. CRIMINAL Div. OF U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT Div. OF U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/defaut/files/criminal-fraud/egacy/20 15/01/1 6/guide.pdf. [hereinafter
FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE].
131. Id. at 52-53.
132. Id. at 52.
133. Id. at 52-60.
134. Id. at 53.
135. Id. at 52.
136. See Holder Memo, supra note 77, at Part II.A.
137. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 130, at 54-56.
138. Id. at56.
139. Id.
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program, it explains, "promotes an 'organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct,"' "protects a company's reputation, ensures investor value and
confidence, reduces uncertainty in business transactions, and secures a
company's assets."1 40 Notably,' the Guidance is not just explaining pre-existing
compliance, but promoting it. 4  The DOJ is going well beyond the Sentencing
Guidelines and the U.S. Attorneys' Manual to convince the readership to invest
in pre-existing compliance. 
142
The subsection, of course, repeats much of the language from the
Attorneys' Manual and memos, and provides a list of attributes of an effective
program. 143 But it then augments those sources with case studies and
hypotheticals. 144 These were unseen in the remedial compliance subsection.
145
Similarly, the following subsection describes international best practices in
compliance, pointing the reader to various other sources of guidance, including
Department of Commerce and Department of State publications, and reports by
the United Nations, OECD, World Bank, World Economic Forum, and Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation.
146
In contrast to the remedial compliance section, the pre-existing compliance
section contains something of a rhetorical flourish touting the benefits of
investing in pre-existing compliance. 47 This is much to the agencies' credit. But
it illustrates the agencies' former emphasis on pre-existing compliance over
148remedial compliance, and the void that now exists in the Pilot Program.
6. DOJ Settlement Documents
As part of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, the DOJ will affix an
appendix with guidance on what the defendant must do to bring its compliance
program up to standard. 149 The appendix is plainly designed not just to advise
the defendant, but to provide yet another public document detailing the DOJ's
standards for effective compliance.' 50 To satisfy deficiencies in internal controls,
compliance codes, policies and procedures regarding compliance with the FCPA
and other applicable anti-corruption laws, companies agrees to conduct a review
140. Id.
141. Id. at 52-54.
142. Id. at 52-63.
143. Id. at 56-63.
144. Id. at 61, 63-65.
145. Id. at 54-56.
146. Id. at 63.
147. Id. at 56-60.
148. See generally FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4.
149. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-1 to C-8, United States v. Zimmer Biomet
Holdings, Inc., No. 12-CR-00080 RBW (D.D.C. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/zimmer-
biomet-holdings-inc-agrees-pay-174-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act (select "Zimmer
DPA" hyperlink); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-I to C-7, United States v. Rolls-Royce
PLC, No. 16-CR-247 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
fcpa/cases/rolls-royce-plc (select "DPA" hyperlink).
150. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce, No. 16-CR-247, at C-I to C-7.
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and, where appropriate, to adopt new or to modify existing internal controls,
compliance codes, policies, and procedures.' 51 Elements that the program should
include are: "high-level commitment" (support from directors and senior
management); "policies and procedures," including policy and procedures
concerning anti-bribery compliance, particularly with respect to an enumerated
list of risk areas such as gifts, hospitality, travel, etc., and their promulgation and
accounting procedures; "periodic risk-based review," occurring no less than
annually; "proper oversight and independence" by one or more senior corporate
executives; "training and guidance," including communications, training, and
certification; "internal reporting and investigation," such as reporting and follow-
up within company; "enforcement and discipline"; "third-party relationships"
(due diligence and compliance requirements); "mergers and acquisitions,"
requiring due diligence, dissemination to newly acquired entities, and appropriate
training and auditing; and "monitoring and testing," taking into account new
developments and international standards.' 52 This guidance is again consistent
with the practice of rewarding pre-existing compliance and, arguably, rewarding
it more heavily than remedial compliance.
That practice-of rewarding both pre-existing and remedial compliance,
though the former more than the latter-would gain momentum through 25 years
of federal enforcement policy. But that momentum would suffer beginning in
2015, as the next section shows.
II. AN ACCIDENTAL DRIFT: THE FCPA PILOT PROGRAM
After decades of promoting compliance in both its pre-existing and
remedial forms, the last couple years have brought a new enforcement priority
into relief. Though FCPA investigations traditionally focused on corporations,
the DOJ came to believe that general deterrence requires a combination of
corporate and individual liability. To this end, the most recent Deputy Attorney
General memo and the Pilot Program itself are focused primarily on enhancing
the DOJ's ability to prosecute individuals.' 
54
In and of itself, this new priority has no bearing on the status of pre-existing
compliance in federal enforcement policy. One might think it would leave the
DOJ's focus on both pre-existing and remedial compliance undisturbed. But it
has not. In focusing on individual prosecutions, the DOJ has rightly recognized
its increased reliance on voluntary disclosure and cooperation credit. 55 And it
has rightly provided clearer and more specific incentives for voluntary disclosure
and cooperation, in obvious furtherance of its goal.' 56 But in doing so, two
peculiar things have happened. First, the DOJ has also elevated the importance
of remedial reliance, as the below discussion of the Pilot Program will show,
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 130.
154. Id. at 1-3.
155. Id. at 4-9.
156. Id.
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despite the tenuous connection between remedial compliance and the Pilot
Program's stated goals.' 57 Secondly, in so doing, pre-existing compliance has
dropped out of the conversation. 58 Neither of these developments bears an
obvious policy justification; the latter is fraught with potential unintended
consequences.
A. The Yates Memo as Precursor
In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates would pen a
memorandum announcing the DOJ's new enforcement focus on prosecuting
individuals. 59 The memo makes no mention of pre-existing compliance, but, in
fairness, neither does it mention remedial compliance.' 60 And there is no reason
why it should have; compliance is admittedly beyond that memo's scope. But
the Yates Memo is nonetheless relevant and significant, as it shows how
enforcement priorities, and therefore policy announcements, are becoming
unrelated to pre-existing compliance. This change of course may help explain
the inadvertent obscuring of pre-existing compliance in the Pilot Program.
The Yates Memo explains:
[O]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking
accountability from the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing. Such
accountability is important for several reasons: it deters future illegal activity, it
incentivizes changes in corporate behavior, it ensures that the proper parties are held
responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public's confidence in our justice
system. '61
The memo then details six steps that enforcement officials and defendants must
take moving forward. 162 First, to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations
must provide "all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the
misconduct."' 63 Second, investigations, whether criminal or civil, should "focus
on individuals from the inception of the investigation. ' 64 Third, where criminal
and civil government investigations are concurrent, the government attorneys
working on each should regularly communicate. 65  Fourth, in most
circumstances, the government will not release culpable individuals from civil or
criminal liability when resolving a matter with the corporation. 166 Fifth, the
corporate resolution of a case should not occur before the government has
157. Id. at 6-7.
158. Id.
159. See Yates Memo, supra note 29, at 1.
160. Id. at 1-7.
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at 2-3.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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developed a "clear plan to resolve related individual cases" and should
memorialize any applicable declinations to individuals.' 67 Sixth, civil attorneys
should consistently focus on individual liability, and should do so irrespective of
the individual's ability to pay a fine.
1 68
This memo cannot be faulted for the compliance policy that would follow
in the Pilot Program. It is relevant here only because it shows the DOJ's new
focus on individual prosecutions, and it thus might help to explain how that focus
left compliance program policy in something of a blur.
B. The Pilot Program's Curious Silence
Released in April 2016, the FCPA Pilot Program Guidance' 69 (a confusing
name, given that "the Guidance" is generally how we refer to the 2012
document) first identifies the main need it seeks to fill: providing more specific
and reliable cooperation credit. To do so, the program takes three factors-
voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and remedial (but not pre-existing)
compliance-and elevates them in importance. 170  It begins, "To provide
incentives for organizations to self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate with a
criminal investigation, and timely and appropriately remediate, the Fraud Section
has historically provided business organizations that do such things with a
reduction below the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range."'
' 71
However, acknowledging that incentives work only when clear and reliable, the
document explains the need for instant program: "These fine reductions and other
incentives have not previously been articulated in a written framework ... we
intend to provide a clear and consistent understanding" of when the Fraud
Section may give additional credit for voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and
remediation.
The program's principal purpose is thus clear: the DOJ will provide clearer
rewards for cooperation in order to incentivize voluntary disclosure, cooperation,
and remediation. But the choice of these three factors-voluntary disclosure,
cooperation, and remediation-is curious. Admittedly, the Pilot Program does
not displace all the other factors that first emerged in the Holder Memo, were
refined in subsequent memos, and then incorporated into the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual. 173 The Guidance makes clear that it "does not supplant the USAM
Principles" and that "prosecutors must consider the ten factors set forth in the
USAM" when resolving cases.174 One of these factors, of course, is pre-existing
compliance. 75 But the DOJ has selected three to elevate in importance, and, as
167. Id. at 2-3.
168. Id. at 3.
169. FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 1-2.
170. Id. at 2-3.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. See McNulty Memo, supra note 96, at 4-5.
174. See FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 3.
175. Id.
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the below analysis of Pilot Program settlements will show, it makes these three
factors the focal points of settlement announcements. Pre-existing compliance is
not among them. 76
The first of the three numbered requirements is voluntary disclosure, which
is now more carefully defined. 177 The Guidance reiterates the familiar criteria
that the disclosure must occur "prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or
government investigation" and that the disclosure occurs "within a reasonably
prompt time after becoming aware of the offense."'1 78 But then it adds one more
requirement, announcing that a complete voluntary disclosure must entail
"disclos[ing] all relevant facts known to it, including all relevant facts about the
individuals involved in any FCPA violation."'' 79 The Pilot Program is thus a
natural outgrowth of the Yates Memo.
The second numbered requirement is cooperation, which now involves
eight factors. 80 The factors generally reflect the DOJ's new focus on individual
liability and international cooperation.' 81 Perhaps most controversially, they
include the new practice of "de-confliction" of an internal investigation with the
government investigation, meaning that the company has not interviewed the
witnesses before the DOJ. 1
82
The third requirement to qualify for the Pilot Program's rewards is timely
and appropriate remediation.' 3  The Guidance explains that appropriate
remediation, especially in relation to compliance, can be difficult to determine in
abstract. 184 But it explains that the newly hired Compliance Counsel (Hui Chen)
is assisting the enforcement attorneys in "refining our benchmarks for assessing
compliance programs."' 85 Accordingly, remediation will involve the implemen-
tation of an "effective" compliance program, with the familiar and fairly general
criteria (culture of compliance, sufficient resources, independence, etc.). 86
Although the Guidance is widely understood to impose three requirements,
there is actually a fourth. 187 It is not numbered, and it does not appear in same
section as the numbered requirements of disclosure, cooperation, and
remediation1 88  It actually precedes them, almost buried in the prefatory
language on page two. There, the Guidance provides that "to be eligible for [the
credit detailed in the memo] even a company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully
cooperates, and remediates will be required to disgorge all profits resulting from
176. Id. at 2-3.
177. Id. at4.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at5-7.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 5.
183. Id. at 7-8.
184. Id. at 7.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 7-8.
187. Id. at2.
188. Id.
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the FCPA violation.' ' 89 Accordingly, to be eligible for the Pilot Program's full
benefits, the defendant must satisfy not three, but four requirements: voluntary
disclosure, cooperation, remediation, and disgorgement.' 
90
If these four requirements are met, either two kinds of benefits will inure to
the defendant.' 9 1  The first kind of benefit, more prominent but perhaps
ultimately less novel, is the quantitative penalty reductions.' 92 If a company has
cooperated and remediated per the memo's requirements, but has not voluntarily
disclosed, it will receive no more than a 25% reduction off the bottom of the
Sentencing Guidelines fine range.' 93 But if a company does this plus voluntarily
discloses-that is, satisfies all three requirements provided in the Guidance-the
DOJ "may" provide "up to" a 50% reduction off the bottom end of the
Sentencing Guidelines range, and sanctions will generally not include a
monitor.' 94 Though again, this is subject to a fourth requirement, stated earlier in
the memo, that the defendant also disgorge.
Though these quantified penalty reductions feature prominently in the
Guidance memo and were the topic of much fanfare, the FCPA bar responded
with something of a shrug, for a couple reasons. By most accounts these
numbers represent what the DOJ was already doing; it has simply never said so
explicitly and publicly.' 95  Additionally, the DOJ protected its prosecutorial
discretion by making the numbers discretionary rather than mandatory.' 96 But
the program's second offered benefit is of greater consequence, as the subsequent
settlements have illustrated. 197 The Guidance provides that where the above three
conditions are met, and the company has disgorged, the FCPA Unit will consider
a declination.[ 98 In this respect, the Pilot Program is, in effect, the DOJ's new
declination policy.199 And pre-existing compliance is no part of it.
20
The intended purposes of this new declination policy may be revealed in the
Guidance's next sentence, which is of unclear logical connection: "[T]his pilot
program is intended to encourage companies to disclose FCPA misconduct to
permit the prosecution of individuals whose criminal wrongdoing might
otherwise never be uncovered. ' '2° 1 Apparently, this strategy uses the prospect of
a declination as an incentive to disclose evidence of individual wrongdoing,
again in furtherance of the Yates Memo.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 8-9.
195. See, e.g., Rolls Royce, No. 16-CR-247, at C-I to C-7.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Luke Cadigan,
Esq. (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865406/download [hereinafter
"Letter from Kahn to Cadigan"].
198. See FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 9.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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C. The Strange Severing of Declinations from Pre-Existing Compliance
The Pilot Program's actual effects may be clearest in application. As of
press time, the DOJ had announced a total of five declinations under the Pilot
Program. In June of 2016, declinations were announced for Nortek 2  Akamai
Technologies,2 °3 and Johnson Controls.2 °4 Then, in September of 2016, the DOJ
announced the closely related declinations of HMT LLC20 5 and NCH Corporation
on the same day. 206
Each of these five declinations was expressly pursuant to Pilot Program.20 7
Each case involved evidence of the bribery of an employee, either of the
defendant or a subsidiary.20 8 But despite sufficient evidence of wrongdoing
within the company, the DOJ did not hold the company liable.20 9 Again
underscoring the Pilot Program's close association with the Yates Memo, these
are all cases where the DOJ seemingly wanted to go after the individuals and was
willing to give the employer a pass, perhaps to enable the collection of evidence
against the individual. 10
These five declinations are substantially identical in the conditions that the
company has satisfied and that warranted the declination. The declinations thus
present a kind of formula, which has five common features. 21 First, each case
involved a voluntary disclosure, 212 as defined in the Guidance. Second, each
company conducted a thorough investigation.23 Third, each defendant
cooperated,21 4 again as defined in the Pilot Program. The fourth factor is
remediation, to include the termination of certain employees and then, of course,
remedial enhancements to the compliance program. Finally, the fifth common
feature, and seemingly an element of the new declination policy, is
disgorgement.2 16
202. Letter from Kahn to Cadigan, supra note 197.
203. Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Ryan Rolphsen, Esq.
(June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/86541 /download [hereinafter "Letter
from Kahn to Rolphsen"].
204. Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Jay Holtmeier, Esq. (June
21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/874566/download.
205. Letter from Daniel Kahn, Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Steven A. Tyrrell, Esq.
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899116/download.
206. Letter from Laura N. Perkins, Assistant Chief, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to counsel for Locke
Lord LLP (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899121/download.
207. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
208. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
209. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
210. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
211. Seesupra notes 197, 203-206.
212. Seesupra notes 197, 203-206.
213. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
214. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
215. Seesupra notes 197, 203-206.
216. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
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Consider the transition from the FCPA Guidance to the Pilot Program. The
former heralded the benefits of pre-existing compliance."' With something of a
rhetorical flourish, it cited numerous white papers and international conventions,
seemingly seeking to persuade the audience that pre-existing compliance is a
good investment. 2 8 The FCPA Guidance mentioned remedial compliance, but it
did so in a straight-forward and subdued way. 219 Remedial compliance probably
gets roughly the same treatment in the Pilot Program declinations-a mention,
though an unspectacular one. 220 The contrast between these documents lies in the
emphasis on pre-existing compliance-tremendous in the FCPA Guidance and
virtually non-existent in the recent declination announcements.21
The absence of pre-existing compliance in the Pilot Program's declinations
is a problem for at least three reasons. First, rewarding pre-existing compliance
is critical if the Pilot Program is to succeed by the DOJ's own criteria. 222 The
Pilot Program's stated goals are: to "deter individuals and companies from
engaging in FCPA violations in the first place"223; to "encourage companies to
implement strong anti-corruption compliance programs to prevent and detect
FCPA violations" 224; and to "increase the Fraud Section's ability to prosecute
individual wrongdoers. '" 225  Thus stated, the decision to elevate remedial
compliance, and to disregard pre-existing compliance, is perplexing. Remedial
compliance would not seem to further any of these goals. It does not relate to the
first goal-of incentivizing companies to invest in compliance "in the first
place;" companies make these enhancements in the second place, after a violation
and, worse yet, an enforcement action. Nor does it relate meaningfully to the
second goal of encouraging companies to implement strong programs. How
many companies are thus encouraged by remedial compliance? Obviously, the
defendant companies are encouraged, but they, of course, represent an extremely
small sliver of the vast number of companies subject to the FCPA's broad
226jurisdictional provisions. For those companies who are not (yet) defendants to
an FCPA enforcement action, remedial compliance would not seem to
incentivize investing in pre-existing compliance; if anything, incentivizing
remedial compliance would have the reverse effect, rewarding companies for
filling in the compliance gaps that they really should have filled pre-violation.
And remedial compliance has no bearing on the third goal of prosecuting
wrongdoers. In sum, none of the program's three goals would seem to be
furthered by remedial compliance to any substantial degree.
217. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 130, at 52-54.
218. Id. at 63.
219. Id. at 54-56.
220. See Letter from Kahn to Rolphsen, supra note 203.
221. Id.
222. See FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 130, at 10.
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Would pre-existing compliance do better than remedial compliance in
advancing the Pilot Program's stated goals? Pre-existing compliance would
plainly help to prevent violations. It even more obviously encourages companies
to invest in compliance. And it arguably would aid in the prosecution of
individuals, to the extent that effective compliance programs would detect
wrongdoing, triggering the internal investigations that uncover further evidence
of the individual's violation for the company to disclose. Put another way, the
Pilot Program cannot effectively achieve its stated goals without incentives for
investing in pre-violation compliance. Remedial compliance does almost nothing
here; pre-existing compliance would do almost everything.
The second fundamental problem with the omission of pre-existing
compliance is that it runs directly contrary to currents in FCPA policy and
commentary of the last several years. When the U.K. passed its Bribery Act in
20 10,227 that country arguably displaced the U.S. as the leader in rewarding pre-
existing compliance. The statute creates a statutory defense to the charge of
failure to prevent bribery where the defendant can prove it had "adequate
procedures" or, in U.S. parlance, a pre-existing compliance program in place at
the time of the violation. If the U.S. wishes to regain its role as a global leader in
incentivizing compliance, the Pilot Program does not seem the way to do it.
The U.S. seemed to take an important step in the wake of this development
when, in November 2015, the DOJ hired its first dedicated compliance expert,
Hui Chen.228 The Department announced that her job would be to "provide
expert guidance to Fraud Section prosecutors" as they considered the enumerated
factors in the United States Attorneys' Manual, "including the existence and
effectiveness of any compliance program that a company had in place at the time
of the conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the
corporation has taken meaningful remedial action, such as the implementation of
new compliance measures to detect and prevent future wrongdoing., 229 Her job
description was thus two-fold: to assess pre-existing compliance programs and to
assess remedial enhancements.23°
Hui Chen's hiring seemed to announce a new era in which the DOJ would
take even more seriously its long-standing commitment to evaluating and
rewarding both pre-existing and remedial compliance. Indeed, her presence in
the DOJ would suggest that we should be rewarding both phases of compliance
more, not less. The Pilot Program does only half of that, elevating remedial
compliance while neglecting pre-existing compliance. It seems incongruous.
There is a third problem with omitting pre-existing compliance from the
Pilot Program. Prior to this program and its five public declinations, the poster-
227. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/
ukpga_20100023_en.pdf
228. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice on the Retention of Hui Chen (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download [hereinafter "Chen Retention
Memo"].
229. Id.
230. Id.
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child public FCPA declination was Morgan Stanley.23  There, the former
managing director plead guilty to foreign bribery, but the company received a
declination.23 2 In a public statement, the DOJ devoted a lengthy paragraph to
praising Morgan Stanley's compliance program. 3  This public declination was
extremely rare.234 Most declinations do not involve any kind of formal statement
by DOJ, being made public instead through company disclosures or other
communications and then compiled privately on such sites as The FCPA Blog.
235
The Morgan Stanley declination is today a fixture of FCPA culture, cited by
name with some regularity in compliance seminars and academic workshops.
Indeed, one might hazard to guess that most followers of the FCPA could
identify the Morgan Stanley declination by name, and very few could name
another public declination.2 36 That is, Morgan Stanley remains tremendously
important and widely recognized for what it represents: the benefits of investing
in pre-existing compliance.
The Pilot Program severs our declination policy from pre-existing
compliance. As the above analysis shows, the DOJ has taken a dramatic turn
away from the Morgan Stanley precedent, now systematically awarding
declinations without mention of pre-existing compliance. 7  The new
declinations' silence on this point raises numerous questions. First, what
message does it send to companies? The DOJ now determines whether liability
should attach to the employer without any public mention of the employer's pre-
231. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads
Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanley-managing-director-pleads-guilty-role-evadi
ng-intemal-controls-required.
232. Id.
233. Id. ("According to court documents, Morgan Stanley maintained a system of internal
controls meant to ensure accountability for its assets and to prevent employees from offering,
promising or paying anything of value to foreign government officials. Morgan Stanley's internal
policies, which were updated regularly to reflect regulatory developments and specific risks,
prohibited bribery and addressed corruption risks associated with the giving of gifts, business
entertainment, travel, lodging, meals, charitable contributions and employment. Morgan Stanley
frequently trained its employees on its internal policies, the FCPA and other anti-corruption laws.
Between 2002 and 2008, Morgan Stanley trained various groups of Asia-based personnel on anti-
corruption policies 54 times. During the same period, Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on the
FCPA seven times and reminded him to comply with the FCPA at least 35 times. Morgan
Stanley's compliance personnel regularly monitored transactions, randomly audited particular
employees, transactions and business units, and tested to identify illicit payments. Moreover,
Morgan Stanley conducted extensive due diligence on all new business partners and imposed
stringent controls on payments made to business partners.").
234. See Richard L. Cassin, The 2016 FCPA Enforcement Index, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017,
8:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/l/3/the-2016-fcpa-enforcement-index.html.
235. Id.
236. The other pre-Pilot Program public declination was PetroTiger. Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Former Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign
Bribery Charge (June 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-chief-executive-officer-oil-
services-company-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-charge. Admittedly, this public declination did not
mention pre-existing compliance. And perhaps relatedly, very few FCPA followers can identify it
by name.
237. See supra notes 197, 203-206.
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existing compliance program. To what extent is that program even relevant to
assessing corporate liability today? Of course, it remains among the ten factors
in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, and it is certainly discussed in settlement
negotiations.238 But in failing to mention it in enforcement policy memoranda or
in the public declination letters, the incentivizing effect is plainly diminished.
Another question is perhaps more academic, but not less disconcerting. A
declination is, by definition, a message that the company should not be blamed
for the violation; the employee may be blameworthy, but the company is not.
Simply put, how can we assess a company's liability for bribery without
assessing its compliance program? The rigor and good faith of the company's
pre-existing compliance program would seem to be by far the first and most
important consideration in determining whether the company had taken adequate
steps to prevent bribery.
But today we are told nothing-literally, nothing-in public declinations
about the strength of the pre-existing compliance program. Maybe the five
companies receiving Pilot Program declinations had pre-existing compliance
programs of varying quality. Maybe they all had great programs in place; maybe
they were all mediocre; maybe they varied in quality, but the DOJ doesn't value
that as much as it used to; maybe they had no compliance programs to speak of
and so were not even mentioned. This is the problem. The public has no idea
where the strength of pre-existing compliance factors into the penalty calculation.
And this cannot help our shared effort to promote compliance and, in turn, deter
corruption.
Indeed, if we are publicly announcing to the world that even where
employees engaged in bribery, the companies will not be held liable, and there is
no mention whatsoever of the company's pre-existing compliance, are we not
implying that the strength of the pre-existing compliance program is actually
irrelevant to corporate liability? This implication seems absurd, and surely no
one at the DOJ intends to send, even tacitly, such a message. But the implied
message has perhaps inadvertently been sent no fewer than five times-the
quality of a company's pre-existing compliance program is not central to
determining whether to issue a declination.
Pre-existing compliance thus must be re-integrated into enforcement policy
generally and declination policy specifically. The next section explores ways we
might do so.
III. BRINGING COMPLIANCE BACK
From its inception in April 2015, the Pilot Program was designed to last one
year, with the DOJ pledging to then "determine whether the Guidance will be
extended in duration and whether it should be modified in light of the pilot
experience.,240 The above sections have argued that pre-existing compliance has
always figured prominently in DOJ enforcement policy and that its current
238. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-28.300.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 197, 203-206.
240. FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 3.
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displacement by remedial compliance is problematic. This section suggests
several ways we might begin thinking about the reintegration of pre-existing
compliance. They are not refined proposals, but rather, an effort to jump start the
dialogue with enforcement officials, compliance professionals, and the FCPA bar
that many FCPA followers hope the Pilot Program will generate."'
A. Two Gaps in the Sentencing Scheme
To recap, the Pilot Program's offered benefits are as follows: a 25% penalty
reduction for cooperation, remediation, and disgorgement; 242 and either a 50%
penalty reduction or a declination for voluntary disclosure, cooperation,
remediation, and disgorgement.24 3
In exploring the potential role of pre-existing compliance in this scheme, I
want to raise two questions: (1) What if the defendant met all conditions for a
50% penalty reduction and had a strong compliance program in place at the time
of the violation?, and (2) What if a defendant met all conditions for a declination
and had a strong compliance program in place at the time of the violation?
If we are to continue our policy of heavily promoting and incentivizing pre-
existing compliance, such a defendant should be entitled to an additional benefit
of some kind. It is not enough to simply say that pre-existing compliance would
factor into whether a 50% reduction or a declination would issue; the point is to
make the role of pre-existing compliance specific and transparent, consistent with
the Pilot Program's stated objectives.
B. Proposals
This section suggests a number of ways to integrate formal, specific, and
transparent rewards for pre-existing compliance into the existing pilot program
framework. The first may seem counterintuitive, but it may actually make sense:
a penalty reduction greater than 50% but less than 100%. This would be a
middle ground between a 50% reduction and a declination. It would apply in
situations where disgorgement and a penalty of some kind are warranted, and, but
for the strength of the pre-existing compliance program, the defendant would get
a 50% reduction. But given the existence of a quality compliance program, that
penalty should be even further reduced. The Department would in effect be
saying to the defendant: you're not all the way to a declination, but you're close.
Although a reduction greater than 50% may seem high, it is still a penalty,
obviously falling well short of a declination.
The second sentencing option would apply where the defendant has met all
conditions necessary for a declination but also had a strong pre-existing
compliance program in place. What reward could the DOJ offer beyond the
241. See, e.g., Measured Against a "Main Goal" the DOJ Has for Its FCPA Pilot Program, the
Program Is Currently Failing, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 8, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/
measured-main-goal-doj-fcpa-pilot-program-program-currently-failing/.
242. See FCPA Pilot Enforcement Plan, supra note 4, at 8.
243. Id. at 8-9.
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current Pilot Program declination? The answer to that question lies in the
language in which the declination is now framed. According to the Pilot
Program's formal announcement, where the defendant has met all requirements,
the DOJ "will consider" a declination. 244 The language is entirely discretionary.
More to the point, the policy says nothing to suggest the degree of likelihood that
a declination would issue-the DOJ may consider declinations but very rarely
grant them, or it may frequently grant them, and the corporate defendant who is
deciding whether to comply with the Pilot Program requirements has no way of
knowing.
What if satisfying an additional requirement-a robust pre-existing
compliance program-would buy the defendant a slightly greater measure of
assurance that it could receive a declination? What if the DOJ signaled that if a
company invests in pre-existing compliance, it is more likely to receive a
declination than a company that has not? A minor change to the Pilot Program
policy that would have substantial value to corporate defendants and would
incentivize increased investment in compliance is a stronger presumption that the
declination would issue.
Completely off the table is any mandatory language; the DOJ would likely
never agree to language such as "will grant" or "shall grant" a declination, nor
should it. Preserving prosecutorial discretion in this area remains critical to
enforcement. But what about a presumption? Couldn't the DOJ insert language
to the effect that where the defendant had met all current declination
requirements, and additionally had a robust compliance program in place at the
time of the violation, the defendant is "more likely" to receive a declination?
Accordingly, the policy could state that where the defendant had voluntarily
disclosed, conducted a full investigation (a requirement not stated in the Pilot
Program Guidance, but a common feature of all declinations issued under the
program), cooperated, remediated, and disgorged, the DOJ "will consider" a
declination. But where the defendant had met all these requirements AND had a
robust compliance program in place at the time of the violation, the defendant is
"likely," or at least, "more likely," to receive a declination. Perhaps satisfying all
these requirements could create a rebuttable presumption-rebutted, of course, in
the discretion of the DOJ-that a declination would issue. Alternatively, the
policy could state that where these requirements are met, a declination will likely
issue "absent extraordinary circumstances," again to be determined at the
discretion of the prosecutor. There are a number of possible formulations, each
of which would signal to the corporate sector that investments in pre-existing
compliance will be rewarded. It would assure companies that incentivizing those
investments has always been a feature of FCPA enforcement policy, and it
remains so today.
Another option is to return to the traditional meaning of declination: a
declination without disgorgement. This is the kind of declination that Morgan
Stanley famously received, even though its employee had plainly engaged
244. Id. at 9.
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committed a violation. 245 That might seem, at first glance, a sensible option for a
company that has met all the Pilot Program conditions for declination with
disgorgement, but who also has a strong pre-existing compliance program. After
all, it was the policy in place when those two rare public declinations-Morgan
Stanley and PetroTiger, discussed above-were announced.
Indeed, one credible alternative declination policy that has been on the table
for some time would do that very thing.246 Billy Jacobson, former second-in-
command at the DOJ's Fraud Unit and now a partner at Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe, first floated this proposal in an April 2012 issue of Bloomberg's
Criminal Law Reporter.247 Jacobson proposed that the Fraud Unit exercise its
prosecutorial prosecution and adopt a policy of not bringing FCPA-related
248
criminal charges if the company can demonstrate that it satisfied five criteria.
Those criteria are: (1) voluntary disclosure of the violation; (2) no participation in
the illegal conduct by senior management; (3) full cooperation with the
government, including providing evidence and other information against
employees, directors, and agents of the company; (4) remedial measures to
prevent future violations, including disciplining culpable employees and adopting
improved internal controls and anti-corruption training; and (5) having adopted a
strong compliance program before the illegal conduct occurred.24 9 Note that this
proposal is essentially consistent with the Pilot Program declinations, with two
exceptions. 250 First, it adds the requirement of a strong pre-existing compliance
program;2 51 second, it makes no mention of disgorgement.2 52
Critics may respond that Jacobson's proposal looks like a U.K.-style good
faith compliance defense, which the U.S. Chamber of Commerce famously
pushed for and the DOJ just as famously rejected.2 53 But the Jacobson proposal
is really something like a compliance/disclosure/cooperation defense, and it is
thus much more demanding than anything that the Chamber of Commerce
proposed or that now exists in the U.K. Bribery Act.254 And if we are already
willing to grant declinations without much regard for the condition of the pre-
existing compliance program, one might argue that a company that had
additionally established a strong pre-existing program is entitled to the added
benefit of a traditional, Morgan Stanley-type of declination.
245. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 231.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 1.
249. Id. at 2.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Why Do People Care So Much About the Proposed FCPA
Compliance Defense?, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Mar. 24, 2015), https://globalanti
corruptionblog.com/2015/03/24/why-do-people-care-so-much-about-the-proposed-fcpa-compliance
-defense/.
254. See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/
pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.
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However, it may simply make sense that a corporate defendant should not
be permitted to keep the spoils of an illegal act. Indeed, this author has heard
corporations-even former FCPA defendants--endorse this very principle, even
though it appears contrary to the corporate sector's interests. To the extent that
most FCPA stakeholders now believe that the defendant, even if innocent, should
not keep the ill-gotten gains, the Morgan Stanley type of declination-a
declination without disgorgement-may have become an historical artifact.
Accordingly, there may now exist something of a "new normal"-a
consensus among FCPA stakeholders on the content and consequences of a
declination. One component of that consensus is that corporate defendants
should disgorge. But another component may well be that a company that has
invested in a strong pre-existing compliance program is entitled to a greater
reward than a company that has not. Indeed, it is almost impossible to imagine
anyone believing otherwise.
The present task for FCPA stakeholders is to figure out how best to do so.
This article has shown that both the possibility and the need exist. There exists
room within the current Pilot Program to provide additional benefits to
companies that had taken the efforts to create industry-standard compliance
programs before they were investigated by the government. And the article has
likewise demonstrated the need: if the program is to succeed by its own stated
goals, we simply must explicitly recognize pre-existing compliance in
announcing, via a declination, that the company should not bear liability for its
employee's wrongdoing. It is hard to imagine a principle of enforcement policy
any less objectionable.
CONCLUSION: PROMOTING COMPLIANCE IN A NEW ADMINISTRATION
In exploring how to credibly factor pre-existing compliance into our
declination policy, some may charge that companies will be able to adopt
''paper" compliance programs and thus get themselves off the hook unjustly.25
Although this risk certainly exists, it is inherent in the very practice of
incentivizing pre-existing compliance. Any effort to evaluate an existing
compliance program will require assessing whether the program was truly
implemented in good faith.256 This risk was originally recognized in the Holder
257Memo, and it has guided DOJ enforcement policy since. To argue for the
impossibility of distinguishing between paper and good faith compliance
programs is to argue that pre-existing compliance should never factor into
charging or sentencing decisions. And that is a place virtually no one wants to
go.
Some may argue instead that the rigor that is necessary to separate the paper
from the good faith programs is simply too resource-intensive given the DOJ's
255. See, e.g., Tom Fox, What Is a Paper Compliance Program?, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Dec. 29,
2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-man-from-fcpa/what-is-a-paper-compliance-
program#.WKHN3 WW8vOg.
256. See generally Holder Memo, supra note 77.
257. Id.
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current capacities. This may well be true. But the DOJ has said that it hired Hui
Chen to address this very problem;258 everyone involved seemed to hope that she
would do that very thing. If she cannot for lack of resources, she may need some
hired help. But to now abandon the commitment to evaluating pre-existing
compliance programs would be a major setback, one no one is prepared to
accept.
Ultimately, the radical position is not that we should incorporate pre-
existing compliance into the center of enforcement policy; rather, the radical
position is that we should not, or that we need not even talk of doing so. Without
attributing poor judgment or animus to the DOJ, we must now recognize that the
current drift of pre-existing compliance is deeply dangerous to the goal of
incentivizing compliance investments and in turn deterring international bribery.
A new presidential administration and political climate may require a new
approach to promoting anti-bribery reforms. The values of deregulation,
decreasing federal spending, maximizing business competitiveness, and a relative
disinterest in international cooperation have gained ascendancy. But rewarding
pre-existing compliance is a policy goal that does not divide FCPA shareholders.
Just as the government has for 25 years asked corporations to bear these
preventative costs, and civil society members seek greater corporate
accountability, the corporate sector has clamored for increased guidance on what
constitutes good compliance and how much they may be rewarded for it. This
pressure resulted in the DOJ hiring Hui Chen, as well as the Pilot Program's
newly explicit policies. It is just good policy, and the DOJ has always
recognized as much. The present omission is likely nothing more than an
accident of the policy-making process. Let's just own it and fix it.
258. Chen Retention Memo, supra note 228.
